A Linear Quadratic Deterministic Continuous Time Game with many symmetric players is considered and the Linear Feedback Nash strategies are studied as the number of players goes to infinity. We show that under some conditions the limit of the solutions exists and can be used to approximate the case with a finite but large number of players. It is shown that in the limit each player acts as if he were faced with one player only, who represents the average behavior of the others.
INTRODUCTION
In most papers in game theory there may be few or many players and solutions and properties are usually studied for a fixed such number. There are also papers where the multitude of players is infinite see Refs.8, 9 as well as many recent papers on games played by an infinite number of automata each one of which interacts with a finite number of neighbors. In the recent literature of mean field games (Refs. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , stochastic games are considered with an infinite number of players who are modeled in a statistical sense. There are also papers where a version of the problem is solved for a finite number of players and the validity or evolution of some property is studied as the number of players goes to infinity (Refs. 5-7).The present paper belongs to this last category. We consider a finite number of players involved in a Linear Quadratic, deterministic, continuous time, infinite horizon Nash Game. To each one corresponds his control and a part of the overall state called his state. The game is symmetric in the sense that the evolution of the part of the state that pertains to each player is influenced in a symmetric manner by the controls and states of the others. Finally the cost of each player depends only on his state and control and it is also symmetric for all the players. We employ the Linear Feedback Nash equilibrium concept and study how the solutions change as the number of players goes to infinity. It should be noticed that the present work is related to recent work on mean field games, Refs. 12-14, and in particular 15 and 16, but there are essential differences. First of all our problem is deterministic whereas those in Refs. 15 and 16 are stochastic. In Ref. 15 , Nash Open Loop finite time horizon solutions are studied for stochastic LQ Games, whereas we consider Linear Feedback Nash Solutions for the infinite time horizon that satisfy the Principle of Dynamic Programming. Also Ref. 16 considers for a stochastic LQ game the Nash Linear Feedback solution like we do, but there the scalar case is considered only whereas we consider the deterministic set up for the matrix case. For the particular structure of game chosen, we show that the limit exists and can be used to approximate the case where the number of players is very large. The conditions for this to happen are related to the existence and properties of solutions of a generalized Ricatti equation, which yields stabilizing solutions for the overall game. The study of an associated not standard Hamiltonian problem is shown to be crucial for the whole analysis .The resulting infinite number of players case shows that under some conditions, each player essentially acts as if he were faced with one fictitious player who represents the average behavior of all the others or the market as a whole.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let us consider a dynamical system with state 1 2 ( , , coupling between the subsystem of player i and the subsystems and controls of the other players. We are thus faced with a many player game problem for which the Nash equilibrium will be sought. The multitude M of the players will be considered as a given constant. Our main objective is to derive the solutions and study the resulting behavior in terms of both state and costs as M grows towards infinity.
The solution concept that we will employ is the Nash equilibrium where the players use linear strategies in the current state 
The finiteness of the costs can be warranted by assuming that the closed loop system is asymptotically stable i.e. the closed loop matrix has all its eigenvalues in the open left-hand plane. Definition 2 A set of linear strategies (where the 1  1  1  2  1  1 ( , ,..., , , ,..., ) ( , ,..., , , ..., ) ( , (0)),
ε is small and its magnitude can be qualified in terms of its arguments, see Comment 6.
The reasons for the choice of this type of Nash equilibrium are several. We know that in the corresponding deterministic discrete time framework, many and perhaps nonlinear strategies may exist; but if we introduce some nondegenerate noise in the state equation, then only the linear ones survive (Markov or Perfect equilibria, Refs 1,2). In the continuous time case, a similar phenomenon appears as regularization due to noise, of the system of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations that characterize (as sufficient conditions) the Nash closed loop no memory solutions in the deterministic case.
NASH SOLUTION
The Nash solution for each player i is sought in the form (3), i.e. restrict ourselves to Symmetric Linear Strategies. (It is known that for the infinite time problem considered here,there might exist nonsymmetric strategies. The reason we consider symmetric ones is because our game is symmetric in the way the state equations and the costs are described. In addition, if one were to consider Linear Feedback Strategies for the finite horizon case i.e. the integrals in (2) were from 0 to a finite T, then the Linear Feedback Strategies -if they existed-they would have to be symmetric, as an inspection of the associated Ricatti -type equations would show).
where we set: 
where he considers in (5.1)-(5.M): (8) into (7) 
Where [ ] 
It is clear now that the problem of player 1 is to minimize his cost subject to the equations (9) .The reason is that the state 1 x and the cost 1 J of the player 1 are influenced by 1 x , 1 u and z on which z the total influence of 1 u is through (7) .The solution is given by the formula:
is the solution of the matrix Ricatti equation:
The 1 2 , L L that are present in the Ricatti equation (14), through the matrix A of (10) are to be identified with
Substituting in (10) the 1 2 , , L L by their equals using (15) we obtain for A the equivalent form (16) that we denote by ( , )
A K w in order to emphasize the dependence on K and w :
It is this ( , )
A K w of (16) that is used in (14) . Notice that (14) has several quadratic terms in K besides the last one appearing in (14) , since ( , )
A K w itself is a linear function of K .The solution of (14) if it exists, is a function ( ) K w which has the value (0) K for 0 w = . Since we are going to let M → ∞ , we will study the behavior of the Ricatti equation (14) by allowing w to be a continuous variable close to 0.
Let us set:
The function ( , ) R K w is analytic in its arguments. Let us set
We plug (17) and group together the terms corresponding to the same powers of w to obtain
Where
Similarly we can derive the formulae for the other
Let us consider the matrix:
It holds: 
Let us introduce the operator 0 ( , ) L K X which is actually the derivative of ( , ) R K w with respect to K calculated at 0
we define:
Equivalently, the operator 0 ( , ) L K X can be written as a "matrix operator" multiplying a "vector": 
which makes the invertibility study of 
Proof
The proof of this proposition is a straightforward application of the implicit function theorem for analytic functions (see Theorem 8.6 inRef.20) and uses the formulae already developed in (17)-(27).
•
It is important to notice that if we want to find the n K 's for 1 n ≥ we have to find the coefficient of the power n w in the equation ( ( ), ) 0 R K w w = and set it equal to 0,which yields an equation linear in n K of the form: 
This is the closed loop matrix of (9) that results when all the players use their optimal strategies and we will have:
We can now state the second proposition that pertains to the existence of a Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition
2.3 The 1 2 , L L that are calculated by using (15) 
Proof
The proof of this Proposition is an immediate consequence of the previously presented analysis.
Comment 1
The equation 0 0 ( ) 0 R K = results in the system: 
T T T T T T T T T T T T T T K A A K Q K B B K K A B B K K B B K K A A B B B K K A B B K K K B B K K A B B K K B B K A B B K K B B K K K A A B B B K K
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It is clear that the gain 1 K that multiplies the state i x of player i depends only on his part of the system and cost. The Ricatti equation (30) for 1 K is the classical one and the 1 K exists and is positive definite under the usual assumptions. The gain K that couples the controller of the player 1 with the states of the others may fail to exist since its existence depends on the generalized Ricatti (31) .Notice that the study of (31) is reduced equivalently to the study of the "Perturbed Hamiltonian"
If Y satisfies (31), then:
T T T T T T T T T T T T I I A A B B B A A B B B Y B B B Y I Y I Q A Y A A A Y Y B B B Y Q A Y B B B A A B B B Y B B B A Y B B B
and thus the matrices A is asymptotically stable. Thus the existence of a Nash solution amounts to studying (30) and (31) and demanding that both 1 2 , c c A A are asymptotically stable.
Comment 2
The invertibility of 0 ( , ) L K X is equivalent to having invertibility of the operators: A A are asymptotically stable. It is the invertibility of the second one that is the more interesting. Let us look at it more carefully: To see that, let us perturb the solution Y of (31) to Y + ∆ to get: 
B Y Q Y A A A Y Y B B B Y Q A A B B B K K
( ( ) ( )) ( ( )( ) )) 0 T T T eigenvalue A A B B B K K eigenvalue A K K B B B + − + + + − + + < (40) or 2 1 1 1 2 1 ( ( )( ) )) 0 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) , ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) ( )
T T f dY t Y t A A A Y t Y t B B B Y t Q Y t dt K t Y t K t
− = + + − + + = = − (42b) 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) 0 ( ) ( ) ( )) T T T T T c c c c f
T c dK t K t A A K t K t A A K t K t B B K t K t dt A t A A B B B Y t
The solution of (42a) goes to the positive definite stabilizing solution of (30) under the usual controllability assumptions on 1 1 , A B .The differential equation (42b) has as equilibrium point the solution Y of (31).Linearizing (42b) around this Y we get the linearized equation (39), and thus we conclude that the Y is an asymptotically stable equilibrium of (42b) if and only if: we will have a Nash equilibrium of the infinite horizon LQ game that can be also considered "Stable" in the sense that is the limit of a finite time horizon equilibrium. Let us now summarize the material of Comments 2 and 3 in the form of a Proposition. 
3.2
If the assumption of 3.1 hold and in addition the eigenvalues satisfy: , 1,2,..., , 1, 2,...,2 i j i n j n n n λ λ < = = + + , then the Nash Equilibrium is a "Stable" one in the sense delineated above.
Proof
The proof is actually given in Comments 2 and 3. We use the classical construction of Ref. 19 . As evidenced from (37), H has the eigenvalues of 2 c A and the negative eigenvalues of 1
Comment 3
The study of H is quite central to the existence and character of the Nash solution and as such it merits independent investigation. First of all it is clear from (34) that H is equal to the classical Hamiltonian which corresponds to the classical Ricatti (30), and since the eigenvalues are continuous functions of the matrix entries, if we think of 2 2 , A B as perturbations, then for sufficiently small values of them the assumptions and thus the conclusions of Proposition 3 hold. Thus it is easy to produce sufficiency nonempty conditions for Proposition 3 to hold. Notice also that H is not Hamiltonian in the sense encountered in the Linear Quadratic Control Theory and the study of the classical Ricatti equation, see Refs.3, 4, and 19 and it can be any arbitrary 2 2 n n × matrix as the choices of 1 2 1 2 , , , A A B B can produce any value for the terms they determine in H . The Q term of H seems to introduce a restriction since it is symmetric and positive semidefinite. Actually any quadratic matrix equation of the form 
Comment 4
The underlying theme of this work is the presence of very many symmetric players, and therefore the limiting behavior as the number of players M grows to infinity is considered. It should be noticed that nowhere did we refer to a game with an infinite number of players, or to 0 K as defining the Nash equilibrium strategy of a player in the presence of an infinite number of players. Nonetheless if one were to make sense of such a limit per se-as if the players are infinite in multitude, the equations (9) are of importance. Notice by the way, that we derived (9) where the variable z concatenates the influence of all the other players on player one, and derived then the Nash equilibrium, although we could have derived the Nash equilibrium working directly on equations (5.1)-(5. M ).Let us look more carefully at equations (9), restated below for convenience. If we consider that the 1 2 , L L have values that converge to definite limits as M → ∞ , a fact that holds under the assumptions of Proposition 2, then the system (9) in the limit M → ∞ behaves like:
Equivalently we can say that player one faces a control problem of minimizing 1 J (as in (2)), where his control is 1 u , and his state 1 x is influenced by a state variable z which z is available to him but is not at all influenced by him: The state z obeys the evolution equation (44) which is not at all influenced by 1 x or 1 u ,as should be expected, since one player on his own should not have any influence on the collective behavior of a infinite number of fellow players. The question is whether we can think of the equation (44) 
J z t Q z t u t S z t u t u t dt
which for appropriate choices of e Q e S , has as solution: 
which results in optimal value 0 since 
Comment 5
It would be important to consider whether 1
For example, if it is positive definite, this means that as the number of players goes to infinity the cost of each player at the Nash equilibrium is decreasing. Let us consider the equation: 
Where 1  1  1  11  12  1  1  1  2  12 22 11  12  2  0  2  1  2  0  1  0  2  1  2  0  12  22  1  2   1 2  2 1  1  1  2  0  0  1  2 1  2  1  1  1  1   2  2 2  2  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  2   2  2  0  0   2 is also negative, it corresponds to another Nash solution that results to an asymptotically stable closed loop matrix, but this Nash solution is not "Stable".
According to Comment 4, we examine the problem: e e e e q s q s ≥ .The right hand side is achieved if the root 2 0 λ < which will happen for the roots that yield an asymptotically stable closed loop matrix i.e. always when we have a Nash equilibrium.
CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper the limiting behavior of a dynamic Nash game was studied with respect to the number of players going to infinity. Similar questions for the discrete time LQ Nash game and for the Stackelberg equilibrium can be considered. The stochastic version of the problem studied here can also be considered for the case where the strategy i u is linear in the estimate of the average (market) state z and the estimate of the state i x . Of interest would be here to examine in the spirit of Ref.5 under what conditions better measurements (for example less measurement noise) are beneficial for the finite time horizon cases as the horizon increases and or as well as when the number of players does.
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